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Summary 
This paper studies the effects of environmental policy on the farmer’s soil optimal 
management. We consider a dynamic economic model of soil erosion where the 
intensity use of inputs allows the farmer to control soil losses. Therefore, inputs 
use induces a pollution which is accentuated by the soil fragility. We show, at the 
steady state, that the environmental tax induces a more conservative farmer 
behavior for soil, but in some cases it can exacerbate pollution. These effects can 
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Soil erosion is a major problem for agriculture in most countries and particu-
larly in developing context. If the rate of soil erosion exceeds the rate of soil
genesis, then soil productivity is expected to decline. Many empirical studies
on soil erosion (Papendick, and al., 1985; Troeh and al., 1991) showed that crop
yields decrease with soil depth in the long run. This diminution of agriculture
yields can be compensated by an expansion of the cultivated land area or an
increase in the fertilizer inputs. However, these options are a sources of nega-
tive environmental externalities such as pollution of surface and ground water.
Hence for an optimal soil management, environmental policy is required to take
into account external eﬀects as well as sustainable soil use.
In the literature, the problem of soil degradation is frequently analyzed
within optimal control models, since the choice is inherently a dynamic one,
involving both temporal and intertemporal trade-oﬀs. Economic and biophysi-
cal factors, such as good prices and production costs, production technologies,
intensity of cultivation, soil depth, and other productivity-related soil character-
istics, determine the agriculture yield. All these factors have been introduced
in dynamic models of resource management (McConnell,1983; Saliba, 1985;
Barbier, 1990; LaFrance, 1992; Clarke, 1992; Barret, 1996; Grepperud, 1997;
Goetz, 1998; Goetz and Zilberman, 2000). The aim of these dynamic models
is the characterization of conditions for an optimal intertemporally use of soil
as a production factor. While, soil erosion is not only a problem of resource
degradation. It also causes negative agriculture externalities, such as water
pollution and sedimentation. Expecting, Loehman and Randhir (1999) and
Hediger (2003), there is no study which integrates optimal intertemporally soil
use and oﬀ-farm eﬀect of soil erosion.
In a two-sector model of rural-urban linkage, Loehman an Randhir (1999)
study the types of public policies that satisfy social eﬃciency for soil erosion and
pollution stock externality. The urban sector is assumed to be more wealthy
than rural. The types of tax/subsidy policies examined range from central-
2ization (with government determining taxes/subsidies) to complete decentral-
ization (with government determination of an initial entitlement followed by
market decision about pollution reduction). To traditional Pigouvian and bar-
gaining solutions extended to a dynamic setting, a third alternative is govern-
ment as a co-producer of environmental goods.
Hediger (2003) integrates the requirement for an intertemporally eﬃcient
and sustainable agricultural land use in the presence of soil erosion into ana-
lytical framework for the evaluation of sustainability at the farm level in which
both on and oﬀ-farm eﬀects are taken into account. To sustain the farm in-
come, an agricultural Hartwick rule is proposed which addresses both eﬀects.
It requires the farmer to invest the soil rents into some suitably identiﬁed alter-
natives of capital. This implies a continuous substitution of alternative income
sources (agricultural or non-agricultural) for traditional sources of income from
crop production that induce persistent soil erosion. Under consideration of the
optimally conditions from the dynamic erosion control problem, this investment
rule enables the farmer to earn a constant income. A charge-subsidy provides an
incentive for pollution control and allows farmers to earn a sustainable income.
Under this scheme, the eﬄuent charge revenues shall be earmarked to subsidize
the retirement of cropland and conversion into extensively used grassland or
forest land.
While their models consider both soil erosion and pollution externality,
Loehman and Randhir (1999) and Hediger (2003) have not studied explicitly
the eﬀects of the environmental policy on the asymptotic soil management. The
aim of this paper is to ﬁll into this gap and to integrate in the same model,
intertemporal eﬃciency management of soil and pollution externality. We ana-
lyze the eﬀects of environmental tax on optimal soil use at the equilibrium with
respect to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of pollution emission in agriculture.
Obviously, soil erosion is a geological process, but the rate of erosion can
be drastically increased by intensiﬁed agriculture activity. Under undisturbed
vegetation there is normally a balance between the soil and the erosion. Culti-
vation of the land usually interrupts this balance because the vegetation cover is
3reduced. The soil provides the growth medium for the plants. As soil and nutri-
ents are removed, the rooting depth for the plants is reduced. The consequence
of lower rooting depth is more severe on shallow soils, which are predominant
on sloping land, than on deep soils. The rate of soil loss, characteristics of the
soil proﬁle, climate and crop grown decide how much soil erosion lowers the
productivity of land. On the back of this soil loss and related yield fall, erosion
also causes surface-water pollution which induce an important social cost.
The surface-water pollution can be seen as point or diﬀuse pollution. The
diﬀerence between them is not so apparent as it may seem at the ﬁrst approach.
In some senses, all pollutants are emitted at a discrete point and are gradu-
ally dispersed to varying degrees as they are spread through the environment.
From a policy point of view, the crucial distinction between point and diﬀuse
sources relies on their ease of identiﬁcation and susceptibility to monitoring.
In this paper, our analyze is limited to the case of a point pollution and ﬁscal
environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the general
model is laid out and optimal conditions of soil use are derived. The dynamics
analysis of the model and the steady-state characteristics are examined in sec-
tion 3. Building on this dynamic framework, the environmental policy eﬀects on
soil management are studied with respect to diﬀerent pollution emission spec-
iﬁcations. Section 4 considers the case where farmer can spend on abatement
technologies which reduces his direct emission. Finally, Section 5, summarizes
the main ﬁndings.
2 The model
We consider a farm-level model which includes functional relationships and im-
pacts among farm management choices and soil characteristics. Considered as
state variable, soil characteristics incorporate soil depth and other productivity
factors. We also include erosion productivity linkages which relate changes in
soil characteristics to agricultural yield function. The latter supposes explicitly
a possible substitution between soil characteristics and other inputs. The soil
4characteristics constitute the farmer’s capital stock whose dynamics is governed
by a biophysical and economic process.
2.1 Assumptions
Let ut be an index of inputs (the cultivation intensity), zt, the overall soil depth
and yt, the physical yield per hectare of the crop at date t. The production
function of a crop is then given by:
yt = f (ut,zt) (1)





> 0. Inputs u and z are necessary to production: f (0,z) =
f (u,0) = 0. We impose fuz = fzu > 0, i.e. marginal productivity of soil
increases with the input use. Finally, function f satisﬁes the asymptotic Inada
conditions.
This production function is in line with the work of Saliba (1985), LaFrance
(1992), Clarke (1992), and Hediger (2003). Unlike other studies such as Mc-
Connell (1983) or Barett (1991), soil loss is not being considered as an argument
of the function since it is a result of the choice of u as well as the development
of the soil depth over time, rather than a choice variable for the farmer.
However, the soil depth not only aﬀects crop yields, it also inﬂuences the
magnitude of soil losses for a given amount of rain. Therefore, a per hectare ero-
sion function given by h(u,z) is introduced. We assume the following properties
for erosion function : hu > 0, hz < 0, huu > 0, hzz > 0, hzzhuu−(hzu)
2 > 0 and
huz = hzu < 0. Asymptotic Inada conditions about the behavior of marginal
erosion functions are implicitly assumed to hold.
As the soil depth decreases the soil becomes ﬁner textured and less friable.
Furthermore, the low content of organic matter in the subsoil decreases the
aggregate stability of the soil particles such that rain can destroy them more
easily. Hence, reduced inﬁltration and permeability as well as the unstable
structure of the soil aggregates together cause runoﬀ and erosion of the subsoil
to increase suggesting hz < 0 1.
1See Troeh and al. (1991).
5An increase in the production intensity will result in higher erosion rates,
implying hu > 0. The structural changes of soil due to water erosion help to
determine the sign of hzz. Rain drops disintegrate on the surface and produce
a compact surface crust. Percolating rainwater dislocates suspended ﬁne soil
particles from the top soil to the subsoil. These changes amplify the magnitude
of soil erosion as the soil layers decrease suggesting hzz > 0. An augmentation of
the production intensity leads to higher erosion rates. However, a simultaneous
accretion of the soil adversely aﬀects this increase which implies huz < 0.
The intertemporal change of the soil depth z at time t is described by:
˙ zt = g − h(ut,zt), z0 > 0 given (2)
where g is the pedogenesis rate, arbitrary taken as constant due to the length
of geological cycles.
In addition to soil erosion, the agricultural activities induce a surface and
ground water pollution. Mineral fertilizer and manure, at levels that exceed
crop uptake, constitute the major sources of agriculture externalities. In terri-
tory where agricultural activities are intensive, this has resulted in phosphorus
accumulation in surface runoﬀ and soil erosion can accelerate the eutrophisation
of surface water. This pollution is not taken into account by farmers, as long as
they are not faced with the social cost of their activity. In practice there is two
types of pollution: point and diﬀuse pollution. The diﬀerence between them is
not so apparent as it may seem at ﬁrst blush. From a political point of view,
point sources are characterized by discrete discharge into the atmosphere or
water environment, whereas diﬀuse sources do not have a clearly deﬁned entry
points2.
In this paper, we concentrate our analyze on agriculture point pollution.
According to Hediger (2003), we suppose that pollution ﬂow is determined on
the one hand by the rate of surface runoﬀ η(ut), which progressively increases
with ut (such that η￿
u > 0 and η￿￿
uu > 0), and on the other hand by the pro-
portional function of soil erosion rate γh(u,z). Altogether, this can be written
2Shortle and Abler (2001), and O’Shea (2002) provide a survey on the economics of
nonpoint-source pollution.
6as:
et = η(ut) + γh(ut,zt) (3)
where γ > 0 is the soil pollutant content (i.e. phosphorus) or the soil ﬁxation
rate, constant over time.
The real net revenue of farmer is given by:
πt = pf (ut,zt) − cut − τet
where p and c are the prices of output and input, respectively and τ, the unit
taxation of any positive emission. Given the perfect competition environment,
prices are constant and are taken as given by farmers.
2.2 The farmer’s program
The farmer is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of net returns
from agricultural production with an inﬁnite time horizon. Thus, the farmer’s





[pf (ut,zt) − cut − τet]e−ρtdt (4)
s.t.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
˙ zt = g − h(ut,zt)
z0 > 0 given
et = η(ut) + γh(ut,zt)
where ρ is the discount rate (real rate of interest). Without any loss of general-
ity, we assume that p is a reference price equal to 1, c > 0 is the real unit cost
of input use and τ the real unit tax.
Using Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, the associated Hamiltonian at date
t in current value is:
H (ut,zt;λt) = f (ut,zt) − cut − τ [η(ut) + γh(ut,zt)] + λt [g − h(ut,zt)]
where λt is the costate variable which can be interpreted as the shadow price
of soil, or as the marginal rent of soil.
Optimal necessary conditions for interior solution writes:
fu = c + λthu + τ
￿
η￿ (ut) + γhu
￿
(5)
˙ λt = (ρ + hz)λt − fz + τγhz (6)
7and the transversality condition is:
lim
t→+∞
ztλte−ρt = 0. (7)
By diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to time, it comes:
˙ ut =
hu˙ λt + [(λt + τγ)huz − fuz] ˙ zt
[fuu − τη￿￿ (ut) − (λ + τγ)huu]
(8)
where ˙ zt and ˙ λt are determined by (2) and (6), respectively.
Static ﬁrst order condition (5) tells that long any optimal trajectory, the
marginal revenue of cultivation (i.e. the marginal productivity of input use)
must be equal to the marginal cost of cultivation which is threefold: (a) the
marginal cost c of using ut units of input at time t, (b) the marginal cost of
cultivation in terms of soil erosion, λthu, (c) the marginal cost of cultivation in
terms of pollution marginal taxation, τ [η￿ (ut) + γhu]. Along the time path, ut
must be adjusted to satisfy at any time condition (5).
In the dynamic condition for optimality (6), (ρ + hz) reads as the marginal
return rate of soil, or as the ”soil discount rate”3. Then, (ρ + hz)λt is the
marginal return of holding a unit of non-cultivated soil, λt being the unitary
shadow price of soil. The other term of (6), (fz − τγhz), is the marginal gain
of using a unit of soil as input, i.e. the marginal productivity of soil reduced
by the marginal cost of soil in terms of pollution taxation. Put diﬀerently, it
denotes the marginal contribution of soil in the proﬁt function. As a result,
current marginal rent of soil λt grows over time as long as it is more proﬁtable
for farmer to let the soil non exploited rather than to cultivate it.
3The farmer can invest a marginal unit of soil at rate ρ on a ﬁnancial market rather than
use it as input. This ”harvesting” results in a diminution in the soil depth and in an increase
of erosion by hz. Then, the marginal return of soil is reduced by the eﬀect of erosion and the
net return rate of soil is (ρ + hz), where hz < 0.
83 The environmental policy eﬀect
3.1 Dynamic analysis
Our intention is to study the dynamics of the model described above, and to
represent it within a (z,λ) diagram. The time argument t is suppressed for
notational convenience. Beforehand, let ￿ u(z) denote the optimal control under





(λ + τγ)huz − fuz






fuu − λhuu − τ [η￿￿ (u) + γhuu]
. (10)
Since fuz > 0, huz < 0 by assumption and {fuu − λhuu − τ [η￿￿ (u) + γhuu]} < 0
by concavity of f and convexity of h, then d￿ u/dz > 0 and d￿ u/dλ < 0. Optimal
intensity of input use increases with the soil depth and it decreases with the
marginal rent of soil. Hence, the farmer becomes more conservative by reducing
its input use as the soil weakens, which appreciates its marginal rent.
Deﬁne D1 as the locus of the (z,λ) points where ˙ z = 0, formally D1 =
￿
(z,λ) ∈ IR2
+∗ | ˙ z = 0
￿
. For any (z,λ) ∈ D1, h(u,z) = g, where g is constant
over time. Then, for any (z,λ) ∈ D1, z and u are constant. From equation (5),
we get the equation of the D1-demarcation curve which is deﬁned as follows:
λ(z) |˙ z=0=
fu (u,z) − c − τ [η￿ (u) + γhu (u,z)]
hu (u,z)
, (11)
for any u such that
·
z = 0. The slope of this curve is measured by:
λ￿ (z) |˙ z=0=
hufuz − [fu − c + τη￿ (u)]huz
(hu)
2 (12)
where [fu − c + τη￿ (u)] can be seen as the ”direct” marginal proﬁt of the
farmer’s, i.e. the part of the marginal proﬁt which excludes the contribution
of erosion. From (5), this last term equals (λ + γ)hu, which is positive for any
positive shadow price of soil. Hence, the D1-demarcation curve is increasing in
the (z,λ) plane. Finally, dynamics of z is as follows: (a) z is constant along the
D1-curve, (b) z decreases for any (z,λ) below the D1-curve, (c) z increases for
any (z,λ) above the D1-curve.
9Similarly, we deﬁne D2, D2 =
￿
(z,λ) ∈ IR2
+∗ | ˙ λ = 0
￿
. From (6), the equa-
tion of D2-demarcation curve writes:
λ(z) |˙ λ=0=
fz (u,z) − τγhz (u,z)
ρ + hz (u,z)
, (13)
for any u such that
·
λ = 0. The gradient of this curve is determined by:
λ￿ (z) |˙ λ=0=
(ρ + hz)fzz − (ργτ + fz)hzz
(ρ + hz)
2 , (14)
which is negative if (ρ + hz) > 0. We assume (ρ + hz) > 0 so that the D2-
demarcation curve is decreasing in the (z,λ) plane. The optimal dynamics
of shadow price is the following: (a) λ increases is constant along the D2-
demarcation curve, (b) λ decreases for any (z,λ) below the D2-curve, (c) λ
increases for any (z,λ) above the D2-curve. Optimal dynamics of (z,λ) is
depicted in Figure 1.




1) of the optimal control problem is determined
by the intersection of the D1 and D2-demarcation curves. Formally, it is char-




[ρ + hz (u∗
1,z∗
1)]λ∗
1 = fz (u∗
1,z∗






1 = fu (u∗
1,z∗
1) − c − τ
￿
η￿ (u∗





Equation (15) means that optimal erosion must be balanced by pedogenesis
to maintain a constant soil depth. Equation (16) tells that, at the station-
ary equilibrium, the farmer is indiﬀerent to cultivate soil or not suggesting a
constant marginal rent of soil. In fact, equation (16) equalizes the marginal
return of holding a unit of non-cultivated soil (left hand side) and the marginal
contribution of soil in the farmer’s proﬁts (right hand side). Similarly, from
(17), the marginal beneﬁt in terms of soil conservation the farmer is expected
to earn by reducing its input use by one unit (left hand side) must be equal to
10the marginal proﬁt he is expected to earn by increasing its input use by one















where πu denotes the marginal proﬁt from using input and πz, the marginal





ρ + hz (u∗
1,z∗
1) > 0, (19)
fu (u∗
1,z∗
1) − c − τ
￿
η￿ (u∗





In other words, the soil discount rate and the marginal proﬁt function must be
positive at the stationary equilibrium.
This steady-state is represented by E1 in the (z,λ) plane of Figure 1. For
any initial soil depth, z0, only one associated initial shadow price, λ0, places the
dynamic system along one of the two branches of the saddle-path which lead
to stationary point E1. Proposition 1 below summarizes all previous results.
Proposition 1 :




1) deﬁned by equations (15), (16) and (17) if and only if conditions
(19) and (20) are satisﬁed.
ii) Under the assumptions that the transversality condition holds and the
assumptions that have been made on functions f and h, (u∗
1,z∗
1,λ∗
1) is a saddle
point (see proof in appendix).
3.2 Discussion on τ
Now, we undertake a sensitive analysis of parameter τ to drawn the eﬀects of the
environmental taxation on the optimal conservation of soil. First, as λ(z) |˙ z=0
is decreasing in τ and λ￿ (z) |˙ z=0 is increasing in τ (see equations (11) and (12)
respectively), a reduction of the lump sum tax results in an upward shift of the
D1-demarcation curve with a lower slope. Second, since λ(z) |˙ λ=0 is increasing
in τ and λ￿ (z) |˙ λ=0 is decreasing in τ (see equations (13) and (14) respectively),
11then a diminishing tax involves a downward shift of the D2-demarcation curve
with a more steep slope. Such moving are illustrated by Figure 2.
[Place Figure 2 here]
In Figure 2, the stationary point E2 refers to the optimal control problem
without any environmental policy, i.e. when τ = 0. Its comparison with E1
reveals the positive eﬀect of the taxation on the stationary soil depth, which is
the purpose of proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 : At the stationary equilibrium, the environmental lump sum
tax induces a more conservative farmer’s behavior for soil management. The
soil conservation increases as the environmental policy becomes restricting for
the farmer.
To really understand the complex eﬀects of the environmental policy, it
may be ﬁtting to decompose them. First, from equation (2), erosion must be
equal to pedogenesis at the steady-state. If the stationary soil level increases,
then the stationary input use must also increase in order to maintain erosion
constant. Hence, the environmental policy results in a more conserved soil and
an higher intensity of input use. At the stationary equilibrium, the farmer can
compensate the tax surcharge by improving the agricultural yield.
While the eﬀect on z is clearly identiﬁed, the eﬀect on the level of e is am-
biguous. In particular, it depends on the posological characteristics of soil, i.e.
on function h and parameter γ. That can be emphasized by totally diﬀerenti-
ating the emission function:
∆e = η￿ (u)∆u + γ [hu∆u + hz∆z]. (21)
Then the environmental tax may prompt the farmer to diminish pollution emis-





η￿ (u) + γhu
, (22)
12where −γhz and [η￿ (u) + γhu] respectively denote the marginal (negative) con-
tribution of soil conservation and the marginal contribution of input use in the
emission of pollution. Hence, the lump sum tax causes pollution to decrease if
the soil conservation the policy involves is important enough to balance the in-
crement of pollution coming from an increase in the input use. In other words,
the environmental policy exhibits a property of double dividend if the soil con-
servation eﬀect overrides the intensity of input use eﬀect which is risen by the
policy in question.
3.3 Discussion on γ
As discussed in inequality (22), the environmental eﬀect of emission taxation is
proved to be ambiguous. In particular, it depends on parameter γ that can be
seen as a fragility index of soil faced to pollution. In Figure 3, we decompose
the global eﬀect of pollution to stress the contribution of soil erosion and the
contribution of direct pollution (surface runoﬀ) on soil conservation.
[Place Figure 3 here]
When the indirect eﬀect of soil erosion on pollution emissions is non-existent,
i.e. γ = 0, then the D1-demarcation curve shifts upward and keeps the same
slope whereas the D2-curve shifts downward and have a more steep slope. We
obtain a new steady-state which is denoted by E3 in Figure 3. The less the
emission function depends on soil erosion, i.e. the smaller is γ, the more taxation
acts as a regulator policy of environmental externalities by reducing pollution
emissions and the less this environmental policy favors the soil conservation in
the long run.
4 Pollution abatement
In this second version of the model, we assume that the farmer can invest
into abatement technologies. Indeed, he must choose the level vt of investment
which will have an abatement eﬀect on pollution coming only from the surface
runoﬀ. Net pollution from surface runoﬀ at date t is then η(ut)/(1 + vt) where
131/(1 + vt) reads as a cleaning up factor and vt as the abatement rate. The






[f (ut,zt) − cut − bvt − τet]e−ρtdt (23)
s.t.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
˙ zt = g − h(ut,zt)




Static ﬁrst order conditions are:










2 = b. (25)
Condition (24) calls to the same comments than condition (5). Condition (25)
equalizes the marginal beneﬁt of abatement investment and the marginal cost
of this abatement. Equivalently, (24) writes v = [τη(u)/b]
1/2 − 1 : the opti-
mal abatement intensity is an increasing function of the lump sum tax and the
intensity of input use and a decreasing function of its marginal cost b. Since
dynamic optimal condition (6) remains unchanged, the abatement policy af-




fu (u,z) − c − τ
￿
η￿(u)




for any u and v such that ˙ z = 0 and where subscript a in λ(z)
a means that
abatement eﬀort acts as a control variable. After developments and simpliﬁca-
tions, we have:
λ(z)










where λ(z) |˙ z=0 is deﬁned by (11). Hence, the eﬀect of abatement expenditures
in addition to an environmental tax is the following: from the case without
pollution abatement, the D1-demarcation curve shifts upward whereas the D2-
demarcation curve does not react as illustrated by Figure 4. Proposition 3
summarizes those eﬀects.
14[Place Figure 4 here]
Proposition 3 : A positive investment into abatement technologies involves a
diminution of the stationary conservation of soil. This eﬀect is proportional to
v/(1 + v) and soil conservation decreases as v increases.
The trade-oﬀ between intensity culture and soil conservation remains the
same: the input use increases pollution emissions and soil conservation de-
creases them. Hence, the eﬀect of an abatement eﬀort and the eﬀect of the
environmental tax on pollution emission are opposed. Abatement expenditures
allow the farmer to reduce its emissions if and only if the resulting eﬀect on
pollution of a diminution in the input use overrides the eﬀect on pollution of
a diminution of the soil conservation. That can illustrated by diﬀerentiating










2∆v + γhz∆z (28)
where (1 + v) = [τη(u)/b]
1/2 and ∆v = (τ/2b)[τη(u)/b]












∆u + γhz∆z (29)
The ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (29) is negative since term in brackets
is positive and ∆u is negative in the case of an increase in the abatement eﬀort
(see Figure 4). The second term is positive since hz < 0 and ∆z < 0. As a















The study of environmental policy eﬀects in agricultural context can not be
dissociated from optimal soil management. This is due to the crucial relation-
ship between, ﬁrst, observed pollution and second, the weakening level of soil
15and the intensivity culture. By considering the pedological characteristics of
soil and environmental externalities, we show that environmental tax induces
two eﬀects in the long run: (a) a more conservative farmer’s behavior in the
soil management and (b) an increase in the input use.
To compensate the ﬁscal fees associated to environmental tax, the farmer
improves his agricultural yield by preserving higher depth soil at the steady-
state. This allows the farmer to use more input in the long run at the risk of
increasing pollution emissions. Therefore, these eﬀects depend on the weight of
erosion rate into the emission function. The smaller is this weight, the larger is
the positive eﬀect of environmental policy on pollution and the smaller is the
conservation of soil in the long run. The same mechanism can be obtained with
abatement expenditures.
An interesting extension of our model is to study other environmental policy
instruments, such as quotas and tradable emission permits, in order to test the
robustness of our main results.
16Appendix: Stability of the steady-state
The stability properties of the steady-state that is characterized in Proposition
1 can be determined by linearizing the dynamic system in (z,λ) around (z∗
1,λ∗
1).









(ρ + hz)λ − fz + τγhz
￿
. (30)








(λ + τγ) dhz
dz −
dfz






where dhz/dz = hzz +hzudu/dz, dfz/dz = fzz +fzudu/dz, dhz/dλ = hzudu/dλ
and dfz/dλ = fzudu/dλ. Since hudu + hzdz = 0 at the steady-state, deter-
minant of matrix J (z,λ) evaluated at (z∗
1,λ∗













Since du/dz > 0, du/dλ < 0 (see (9) and (10) respectively), hu > 0, hzu < 0,
hzz > 0, fzu > 0 and fzz < 0, then detJ < 0 which means that the product of
the two eigenvalues of J is negative. As a result, eigenvalues of J are opposite
signed and (z∗
1,λ∗
1) is a saddle point.
Since the dynamic system allows two converging director vector and two di-
verging director vectors, three cases are conceivable for any initial point (z0,λ0):
(a) in quadrant I and II of Figure 1, (z0,λ0) places the dynamic system
along one of the two branches of the saddle path and the system converges to
the steady-state;
(b) the dynamic system is initially located in quadrant III or it deviates
towards quadrant III;
(c) the dynamic system is initially located in quadrant IV or it deviates
towards quadrant IV.
One can check that cases (b) and (c) do not satisfy transversality condition
(7) and then, the only feasible asymptotic solution is (z∗
1,λ∗
















Figure 1: Dynamic optimal management of soil erosion.
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of the environmental policy on optimal dynamics.
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of abatement technologies.
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